Tag Archives: global

Catholic Institute for Nonviolence: new developments

. . DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION . .

Email received from Pace é Bene (see authors below)

We are happy to announce that Ken Butigan, a long-time Pace e Bene trainer and organizer, has been selected to be the co-director of the Catholic Institute for Nonviolence. He will continue to serve as Strategy Consultant at Pace e Bene, where he has worked for many years.

With Pope Francis’ blessing, the institute was launched in 2024 with the aim of making nonviolence research, resources, and lived experience more accessible to Catholic Church leaders, communities, and institutions worldwide. It is a project of Pax Christi International’s Catholic Nonviolence Initiative, with which Pace e Bene has been actively involved since CNI was established after a landmark conference ten years ago this spring. [The institute is based in Rome.]


Ken Butigan and Marie Dennis in St. Peter’s Square, October 2024. Photo: Pax Christi International.

The “Nonviolence and Just Peace” conference was held at the Vatican and cosponsored by the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace and Pax Christi International in April 2016. It brought scores of theologians, scholars, Church leaders and, most significantly, practitioners from war zones and other hot spots around the world together to gather in hope of seeing this 2,000 year-old institution actively re-embrace the nonviolence proclaimed and lived by Jesus.

(Article continued in right column)

Question related to this article:


How can we develop the institutional framework for a culture of peace?

(Article continued from left column)

After a year of planning (which Ken Butigan and John Dear, representing Pace e Bene, were part of with so many others, including Marie Dennis of Pax Christi), the conference was a dazzling, multi-layered conversation that culminated in an assembly-wide, consensus-based document entitled, An Appeal to the Catholic Church to Re-Commit to the Centrality of Gospel Nonviolence.

CNI was formed as a project of Pax Christi not long after the conference, with leadership from around the world, including Pace e Bene. CNI has been at it ever since, building relationships at the Vatican and with partners worldwide, holding two other conferences in Rome, publishing books, papers and articles; sponsoring many webinars and seminars, and organizing countless meetings. All of this has been focused on inviting the Church to come to a richer and deeper understanding of a nonviolence that combines the power of rejecting violence, the power of refusing to harm others, and the power of love in action. We have been heartened by the prophetic call to nonviolence Pope Francis made repeatedly and that Pope Leo has continued.

The spirit of nonviolence is present in the pope’s recent encyclical, Magnifica Humanitas, including its call to “disarm AI” and its declaration that “the ‘just war’ theory, which has all too often been used to justify any kind of war, is now outdated. Humanity possesses far more effective and capable tools for promoting human life and resolving conflicts.”

Ken is grateful for all the ways Pace e Bene has supported CNI and the Catholic Institute for Nonviolence. We look forward to deepening and broadening our ongoing partnership in working to advance nonviolence in the Church and the world.

Peace and all good,
Erin, Ken, Rivera, Stacie, Layal, Rosie, Mili, and the Pace e Bene Team

– – – – – –

If you wish to make a comment on this article, you may write to coordinator@cpnn-world.org with the title “Comment on (name of article)” and we will put your comment on line. Because of the flood of spam, we have discontinued the direct application of comments.

World Peace Foundation: who is asking what’s next for peace? Part 2

. . DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION . .

An article by Michelle E. Anderson from the World Peace Foundation

This April, WPF launched its newest research program on the future of peace. In part one this essay begins with a preliminary global mapping of contemporary peace-focused work and some of the different approaches and patterns that emerged across contexts. Part two turns to futures-oriented thinking and explores how WPF’s approach seeks to bring these conversations into dialogue.

Current ways of engaging the future

In order to think beyond stakeholders who identify with peace-related work, this mapping also explored who was engaging with questions of the future more broadly, and in what ways. This included the field of futures studies, which encompasses methods such as forecasting, foresight, and scenario-building, as well as other domains that work in the business of long-term change but in less explicit ways. These preliminary observations reveal a range of ways of understanding the future itself, and the different assumptions that shape how it is approached.

There is a group of actors that look at the future as something to anticipate and plan for- these are often multilateral institutions or governments, or groups that support them. In these contexts, foresight is integrated into governance processes, often through scenario-building and risk analysis. For example, the United Nations Futures Lab  is a strategic foresight unit that describes itself as “dedicated to future-proofing the UN and multilateral system.” The OECD Strategic Foresight Unit  is more outward looking, partnering with governments in member states on the basis that strategic foresight “helps policy makers improve the effectiveness of governments by identifying opportunities, challenges, risks and disruptions that may arise over the coming years.”

Other work focuses less on anticipating the future and more on reshaping the systems that will produce it. Institutions such as the Stockholm Resilience Centre  or the New Economics Foundation, for example, engage with the future with “transformation” in mind, pursued through collaborative efforts between local changemakers, researchers, and policy advocates to redesign economic, ecological, and governance structures. While not typically framed in terms of peace, their work is among a set of future-oriented efforts that address many of the underlying challenges– such as climate and economics– that shape its possibility.

A smaller and more diffuse but informative strand of work approaches the future as something to be reimagined and contested. Drawing on speculative, decolonial, feminist, and abolitionist traditions, among others, these types of efforts emphasize imagination, narrative, and the role of alternative epistemologies in shaping what futures become thinkable. Within this, the future is not simply something to be predicted or designed, but something that is actively constructed through political and cultural processes. Recent work on reproductive justice futures  and futurisms  offers a useful example of this orientation. Emerging from a black feminist tradition that links bodily autonomy (the goal) to social, economic, and environmental justice (the conditions through which that goal can be realized), it treats the future as something to be collectively defined through questions of care, experimentation, governance, and access to resources. Abolitionist approaches similarly emphasize that transformative futures are not simply distant ideals, but are built through present-day practices and experimentation, including community care networks, participatory defense initiatives, mutual aid, and other efforts that attempt to prefigure alternative social arrangements. Within these approaches, the future is both expansive and immediate: not something deferred until ideal conditions emerge, but something actively constructed through political, social, and cultural practice.

Another area of work that helps to expand this picture is that related to climate futures. In contrast to more clearly defined and explicitly-named “futures” strands such as reproductive justice futures, “climate futures” spans a wide range of modes of working, from forecasting and risk management  to frameworks that rely on justice and imaginaries. Some efforts, such as the Climate Futures Initiative  at Princeton, attempt to bridge scientific, normative, and policy-oriented approaches by examining questions related to climate justice, international equity, environmental values, and the political mechanisms through which scientific knowledge shapes decision-making.  Others, such as the Undisciplined Environments  platform for scholars and activists, approach climate futures through more critical and experimental lenses that foreground environmental humanities, alternative imaginaries, and the cultural dimensions of ecological crisis. Still others have written about using climate imaginaries  as tools for justice-centered policy evaluation, highlighting another possibility for combining deep theoretical work with practical outcomes. Work under the umbrella of “climate futures” illustrates how different orientations toward the future can coexist within a single domain, and possibly in support of one another.

Many transformative futures-oriented approaches can be traced to concepts of political imagination and imaginaries. While a wide range of understandings of “political imagination” exist, broadly speaking, it is concerned with how visions of the future take shape, whose perspectives gain traction, and how dominant ways of organizing social and political life are reproduced or contested. Much of this literature still also emphasizes the limits of imagination, which is not neutral and can be constrained, co-opted, or detached from the institutional and material conditions that shape what can be realized in practice. Increasingly, however, these ideas are not only the subject of analysis but are being taken up as part of practice. One strand of this includes participatory, artistic, or narrative-based approaches that treat imagination as part of processes of social and political change. Initiatives such as University of Southern California’s Civic Imagination Project, which uses workshops, storytelling, and collaborative worldbuilding exercises to help communities imagine and identify actions toward alternative social and political futures, or Adelaide University’s future-focused interactive museum exhibit  on practicing alternative futures, illustrate how imagination can function as both a method and a site of intervention, offering space not only for new futures to be envisioned, but also for collective reflection on how they might be pursued in practice.

Across these different orientations toward the future, peace is rarely the central organizing concept, yet the domains of focus are precisely those that shape how peace is constituted in practice. As a result, many of the most consequential questions about the future of peace are being taken up indirectly, across fields that do not name them as such. This points to a more diffuse landscape of work that does not sit neatly within either “peace” or “futures” as defined fields, but nonetheless grapples with many of the same underlying questions. Rather than forming a clearly bounded field, these efforts are dispersed across domains, practices, and vocabularies, often without being recognized as part of a shared conversation.

Bringing peace and futures into conversation

This initial mapping points not to a simple divide between or within peace work, futures work, and adjacent approaches, but to a complex landscape shaped by different assumptions about the future and how it can be engaged. These assumptions, in turn, shape how questions of peace are framed, where they are located, whether they are made explicit or remain implicit, and what becomes visible or obscured when it is not named as such.

(Article continued in right column)

Question related to this article:


How can we develop the institutional framework for a culture of peace?

(Article continued from left column)

One pattern that this mapping endeavor made clear is that institutions explicitly identifying with peace or peacebuilding tend to work in present- or near-term timelines, and most often through governance, security, or post-conflict recovery frameworks. While this does not mean that questions of the future are entirely absent, they are not often treated as a sustained or central area of inquiry. Some policy and multilateral institutions have held dialogues or produced reports that incorporate elements of foresight such as scenario-building, risk analysis, or the identification of emerging trends. These modes inherently attend to how existing systems might be strengthened, adapted, or made more resilient in the face of shifting geopolitical, technological, or environmental conditions, but without fundamentally challenging the underlying assumptions or institutional logics in which they operate. For example, a 2025 report from the Stimson Center on the Future of International Cooperation  argues for the need to strengthen global governance through measures such as expanding the jurisdiction of international courts, reinforcing human rights compliance mechanisms, establishing new coordinating bodies such as a United Nations Climate Change Council, and improving regional capacity and financing structures. These recommendations reflect a focus on reforming and strengthening existing institutions rather than rethinking the systems within which they operate.

Other efforts have gone somewhat further in attempting to rethink the assumptions, relationships, and practices through which peacebuilding is carried out. For example, Humanity United’s 2025 report, A Pathway to Peace, grounds its rationale in the many challenges facing peacebuilding today, including the limited adaptability of multilateral institutions and shrinking financial support for peace and humanitarian efforts. Drawing on input from peacebuilders around the world, it proposes an “engagement framework” centered on more inclusive, locally grounded, and adaptive approaches. However, this framework- perhaps necessarily in its effort to provide practical guidance for the current moment- remains largely oriented toward improving how peace efforts are carried out in relation to existing funding structures and institutional arrangements. Interestingly, the report acknowledges that their proposals may still challenge established assumptions about expertise, neutrality, and power, and may be met with resistance, highlighting a tension between efforts to rethink practice and the institutional contexts in which they are situated. It may also be a nod to Humanity United’s listed topical focus on “innovative pathways for peace,” suggesting that these efforts are part of an emerging area of work oriented toward linking imagination, innovation, and action.

There have been some efforts by explicitly peace-focused actors to take up questions of the future that argue for a more transformative approach, though these also mostly remain episodic. For example, the Re-thinking Peace and Conflict Studies in a Postcolonial World  conference held in Tunis in 2025 brought together scholars from multiple regions and disciplinary backgrounds to reflect on how the field itself might be reoriented. Discussions emphasized the need to move beyond dominant frameworks and rethink how knowledge is produced and whose perspectives are centered. This was reflected not only in the themes of the conference but in how it was organized, with one participant describing it as “a plurivocal ecology of knowledge,” a collaborative way of working that privileges neither centre nor periphery. While such efforts suggest a growing recognition of the need to think beyond existing models, they do not yet cohere into a sustained area of work across organizations.

Beyond individual reports or convenings, there are some early attempts to build more sustained platforms for this kind of exchange.  For example, the Alliance for Peacebuilding’s “Future of Peace and Security” project seeks to bring together practitioners, policymakers, and researchers to examine how emerging trends, including shifts in technology, geopolitics, and governance, may shape the conditions for peace and conflict. In doing so, it creates space for forward-looking reflection within established networks.

Even so, what emerges from this mapping is a fundamental disjunction between those engaged in more imaginative or visioning work and those operating within policy and institutional frameworks. At a moment when dominant systems are fracturing, this divide is not just analytical but consequential. This suggests that the broader imperative is not simply to introduce future-oriented thinking into peace work, but to create spaces where different ways of engaging the future– whether anticipatory, structural, or imaginative– can be brought into conversation with different understandings of peace, and where long-term connections between them can and should take shape.

Implications for the Future of Peace

This dispersed landscape of conceptualizations and approaches relevant to the future of peace presents both opportunity and challenge. How can these different modes of thinking be brought into conversation without collapsing one into the other? How can they be used as building blocks for something new, rather than being forced into existing frames or reduced only to familiar forms such as policy forecasting or abstract scenario-building?

The Future of Peace program is an effort to explore synergies between approaches that are often kept entirely separate. It takes seriously the need for grounded analysis while also creating space for more expansive and exploratory thinking about what peace could be, and how those possibilities take shape in practice. The aim is not only to bridge existing efforts, but to open up novel ways of working across them.

Rather than centering a single framework, we aim to bring into conversation a range of people, modes of working, and schools of thought that are rethinking peace in different ways. This includes perspectives that have long challenged dominant assumptions about order, governance, and coexistence, alongside work grounded in policy and practice, without being limited to either.

In these early stages, the program is being shaped through a set of evolving guiding questions. Among them are the following: How is peace being reimagined in the current moment, and by whom, particularly in ways that look to longer-term futures or alternative possibilities? What would it mean to take these reimaginings seriously as starting points for inquiry and even guidance, rather than treating them as peripheral to policy or practice?

As the Future of Peace program develops, this work will continue through further mapping, engagement with different bodies of work and practice, and the cultivation of conversations that bring these perspectives into closer relation. The aim is not only to identify what exists, but to better understand how different approaches to peace and the future can inform one another, and where new connections or directions may be needed, helping to build a foundation for the program’s ongoing work.

At a moment marked by uncertainty, polarization, and rapid transformation, revisiting the question of peace is both necessary and fraught. The aim of the Future of Peace program is not to resolve these tensions, but to work within them, opening space for new ways of thinking about what peace is, how it is shaped, and what it might yet become.

We see this as an ongoing conversation, and an invitation to think together about the future of peace. This mapping is necessarily partial, and this essay even more so. We welcome hearing from those whose work is represented here, as well as those we may not have captured but who are engaging related questions and challenges. We look forward to connections, reflections, and suggestions as this work continues to take shape.

– – – – – –

If you wish to make a comment on this article, you may write to coordinator@cpnn-world.org with the title “Comment on (name of article)” and we will put your comment on line. Because of the flood of spam, we have discontinued the direct application of comments.

World Peace Foundation: who is asking what’s next for peace? Part 1

. . DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION . .

An article by Michelle E. Anderson from the World Peace Foundation

This April, WPF launched its newest research program on the future of peace. This two-part essay begins with a preliminary global mapping of contemporary peace-focused work and some of the different approaches and patterns that emerged across contexts. Part two turns to futures-oriented thinking and explores how WPF’s approach seeks to bring these conversations into dialogue.

Across policy, research, and practice, peace is often approached as something to be built, stabilized, or measured. Whether framed through the language of peacebuilding, security, or even strategic foresight, much of this work is concerned with how existing systems can be made more responsive to emerging challenges. Meanwhile, today’s immediate crises– including wars in Iran, Lebanon, Sudan, and Ukraine– alongside the erosion of multilateralism and the limits of liberal peace frameworks, underscore the difficulty of translating existing models for peace into durable outcomes.

Alongside this, a different set of conversations is unfolding across various movements, intellectual traditions, and future-oriented fields of inquiry. Here, the language is less about mitigation and stability and instead about transformation, alternative futures, imagination, and the reorganization of social and political life. Much of this work is deeply grounded in lived realities and ongoing struggles over justice, governance, care, and survival, even as it often remains fragmented across organizations, movements, and institutional settings. These efforts are also not often framed explicitly in terms of peace, despite engaging many of the underlying conditions that shape its possibility.

It is clear that a wide range of people and institutions are grappling with how societies might move toward less violent, more just, and more sustainable futures. However, the disconnect between these conversations, ways of thinking, and practical action raises broader questions not only about how peace is pursued, but about how it is understood and imagined. What does it mean to bring imagination into conversations about the future of peace while remaining grounded in political and practical realities? More fundamentally, who gets to imagine the future of peace, and under what conditions do certain futures become thinkable and actionable?

WPF’s new Future of Peace program emerges from a long lineage of peace studies and movements, from pragmatic and policy-oriented traditions to more critical and speculative lines of thought. We are not the first to ask what peace might look like beyond current frameworks, nor the first to question whether existing models and practices are adequate for the challenges we face. What matters, then, is not simply posing the question again, but considering what it means to ask it in the current moment. What can be learned from past efforts, and where do they fall short in addressing contemporary forms of violence, power, and uncertainty?

Approach & limits

As a first step in developing the program, we conducted an initial landscape mapping to better understand how different actors, including research and policy centers, think tanks, and related organizations, are currently engaging with the concept of the future of peace, whether explicitly or implicitly. First, though, it is important to note that the concept of ‘peace’ itself is not defined or resolved in this essay. Even within peace studies, there is no single agreed-upon meaning, with divergent and sometimes competing understandings. These range from conceptual distinctions such as negative and positive peace, to frameworks such as liberal peace and its critiques, to lenses such as everyday peace, among many others. This essay therefore treats peace as an open and contested term, which will be taken up more directly in future work within the program. This also shapes how work is identified and categorized in the mapping that follows.

This mapping focused in part on identifiable institutions and organizations as entry points, while recognizing that this offers only a partial view of a broader and more diffuse set of practices and ways of engaging these questions, particularly those not organized through formal institutional structures. This included actors who identify with peacebuilding or conflict-related work, those utilizing futures-oriented thinking, as well as those working in adjacent areas who do not use either label but are asking related questions. This initial mapping surfaces a wide range of work across policy, practice, research, and more exploratory or imaginative spaces. It points to a field that is active and evolving, but also uneven in how these conversations connect, or in the underlying assumptions of what ‘peace’ or ‘the future’ entails.

This preliminary mapping is unavoidably partial and shaped by the terms and methods used. These limitations include the use of English-language search terms, and the choices made about which terms to prioritize. For example, in looking just at peace related work, after some testing, we searched for “academic peace institutes” paired with different regional groupings. These choices helped make the landscape more legible, but also shaped what was made visible through this process. As a result, this approach risks overlooking work communicated through different vocabularies, in other languages, outside of formal institutional structures, or without a strong digital footprint. However, while the mapping initially sought to focus on academic and adjacent institutions, many results were for NGOs, think tanks, and practitioner networks, which is in itself revealing, and therefore included below. The regional groupings presented here are also provisional, reflecting just one possible way of describing an uneven landscape based on early patterns that surfaced in these searches.

Even with these limitations, this mapping points to several distinct areas of work that are relevant to the questions at hand. The sections that follow move across three of these. First, we look at actors who explicitly identify with peace or peacebuilding as their primary area of work, and the ways this field is currently structured across contexts. In part 2 of this essay, we turn to forms of futures-oriented thinking, examining how different actors approach the future itself, and what this might reveal about the conditions shaping peace. Finally, we consider efforts to bring these strands into conversation, looking at where questions of peace and the future begin to intersect and what this might suggest for future directions of the field.

The current landscape of peace work

An exploration of peace-focused institutions across the globe suggests important regional variation in how peace is framed, organized, and pursued, though these observations remain preliminary. These differences are not only conceptual, but institutional. That said, the regional distinctions outlined below should be understood as broad tendencies rather than fixed categories, with significant overlap, variation, and exceptions across contexts. While this phase of the mapping effort was not specific to the future of peace but rather peace related institutions more broadly, these initial findings offer insight into where and how more transformative or future-oriented conversations may already be taking shape. The regional groupings presented here are not based on a single predefined framework, but instead reflect patterns that surfaced through the mapping process, as well as an effort to attend to contexts where the organization and institutionalization of peace-related work appeared to differ in meaningful ways. Irrespective of region, explicit conceptual engagement with “peace” was uneven. While some institutions and initiatives treat peace itself as an object of critical inquiry, in many cases it functions more as an assumed or loosely defined outcome of ending or managing conflict.

(Article continued in right column)

Question related to this article:


How can we develop the institutional framework for a culture of peace?

(Article continued from left column)

In North America and Europe, peace-related scholarship is often embedded in dense networks of academic, policy, and practitioner institutions, and tends to focus on governance and institutional responses to conflict. However, these regions are not internally uniform; separating the United States and Canada would likely reveal further variation (particularly in how questions of reconciliation, indigenous sovereignty, and settler colonial histories are incorporated), as would looking more closely at subregions within Europe, given that many of the institutions that surfaced through this mapping are concentrated in the United Kingdom and Nordic countries. Alongside university-based peace and conflict studies centers and academic networks such as the UK’s Oxford Network of Peace Studies, independent Nordic research institutes such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) or the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) are looked to as thought leaders, producing data-driven analysis on conflict, arms transfers, and security. Accordingly, dominant narratives from both North America and Europe reflect an orientation toward analyzing, managing, and responding to conflict through institutional and policy frameworks, with “peace” positioned as an outcome of effective governance and security arrangements.

In Latin America and Africa, institutionalized peace work is more frequently connected to questions of social transformation, inequality, and justice. In both regions, peace is often treated not only as a matter of governance or conflict management, but as part of broader struggles over social and political order. In Latin America, there is a recurring emphasis on peace not simply as the absence of conflict, but as a lived, relational process shaped by social and political transformation. This is reflected in initiatives such as FLACSO Ecuador’s Acción No Violenta program, which situates peace as nonviolence within historically and politically specific contexts, and the CALAS Visions of Peace research program, which explicitly examines the ambiguities and “gray zones” between violence and peace rather than treating transitions as linear or complete. At the same time, institutions such as the United Nations-mandated University for Peace in Costa Rica reflect a more internationally oriented institutionalization of peace studies, connecting peace and conflict education to sustainable development, environmental issues, and human rights.

In Africa, similar themes around justice, inequality, and social transformation are present, though the landscape appears more institutionally networked and practice-oriented than conceptually unified. Considerable regional variation likely exists, including across linguistic, political, and conflict contexts, but the search surfaced a particularly dense ecosystem of university programs, mediation institutes, training centers, and regionally embedded peacebuilding organizations operating within a broadly recognizable peacebuilding sphere.  Organizations such as the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) work across mediation, early warning, governance  and community-based peacebuilding, while institutions such as the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes  (ACCORD) combine conflict analysis, mediation support, policy engagement, and practitioner training through partnerships with regional and continental actors, including the African Union.These efforts reflect a field that includes- and sometimes bridges- institutional, regional, and locally embedded forms of peace practice.

In Oceania, the mapping suggests that there is a mix of globally oriented academic and policy approaches alongside initiatives more explicitly grounded in local and cultural understandings of conflict and coexistence. Academic institutions such as the University of Otago’s National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies  in New Zealand and similar programs at Australian universities tend to align with traditional peace studies approaches, often focusing on governance, security, and policy-relevant analysis, though there is some incorporation of critical and Indigenous-informed perspectives. In contrast, network-based and practitioner-oriented initiatives place greater emphasis on relational, nonviolent, and dialogue-based conflict transformation, and peace is understood through context-specific and relational understandings of social, ecological, and political life. For example, Transcend Oceania  describes its work as “building on local knowledge systems, skills and approaches of Oceania.” While not necessarily framed as a critique of dominant models of peace, these initiatives certainly reflect different assumptions about social order, responsibility, and coexistence, particularly where they draw on Indigenous knowledge systems and locally embedded practices.

In the Middle East, relatively few academic institutions explicitly identifying as peace-focused were identified. Instead, relevant work appears to be more often embedded within NGOs, policy organizations, or broader governance and security agendas.  For example, the Arab Forum for Alternatives  in Lebanon does not claim to do peace work, but hosts regional network building, research, training, and activism with the aim of advancing justice and equality through political transformation. Palestinian professor and peace activist Mohammed Dajani Daoudi points out  that, “Despite the state of crisis that evolved in a violent conflict which the Middle East has been undergoing, not a single university in the Arab region offers a Ph.D. program on peace, moderation, interfaith dialogue, and reconciliation studies to promote a culture of peace, tolerance, and coexistence.” While Professor Daoudi puts forth a compelling argument for why such a program is needed and how it would support critical thinking, dialogue, and innovation toward addressing the complexities of social transformation, the gap may reflect differences in how the field is institutionalized, what is seen as valuable or relevant, or the political conditions under which such work can take place.

Asia presents one of the most internally uneven and institutionally diverse landscapes identified through this mapping, with significant variation across subregions in how peace is framed, institutionalized, and practiced. In some places, these efforts rely on philosophical traditions (e.g., Gandhian, humanistic), while others use governance and security frameworks, and still others can be better characterized by applied peacebuilding ecosystems. In East and Northeast Asia, ‘peace’ is often institutionalized within universities and research centers, such as the Toda Peace Institute in Japan, frequently with an emphasis on topics such as security, diplomacy, and historical reconciliation. In Southeast Asia, mapping surfaced a developed ecosystem of training institutes, regional networks, and hybrid academic-practitioner initiatives centered on  capacity-building for applied peacebuilding. For example, the Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute  in the Philippines describes itself as “a resource for peacebuilders: providing skills, conducting research and building solidarity within the Asia-Pacific Region.” In South Asia, by contrast, the landscape appears more fragmented, spanning policy-oriented think tanks, smaller institutes, and advocacy networks focused on security, diplomacy, and cross-border cooperation. Across these contexts, peace is framed through multiple and sometimes competing lenses.

Regional differences are evident not only in how peace is framed, but by the variation in the institutional forms and mandates across these examples. These divergences likely reflect not only political, economic, historical, and cultural contexts, but underlying conditions including funding structures and opportunities, institutional mandates, and political constraints. While these patterns do not explicitly or immediately point us toward who is similarly engaging with the ideas or ‘big rethinking’ efforts underlying the Future of Peace project, they might still suggest where alternative ways of conceptualizing and pursuing peace are already underway.

– – – – – –

If you wish to make a comment on this article, you may write to coordinator@cpnn-world.org with the title “Comment on (name of article)” and we will put your comment on line. Because of the flood of spam, we have discontinued the direct application of comments.

UAB School for a Culture of Peace annual report: highest number of armed conflicts in the world in the past decade

FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION

A report from the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

The UAB School for a Culture of Peace publishes today its annual report—one of the main yearbooks in Spain on conflictivity, human rights and peacebuilding. The report identifies 40 wars currently existing in the world, the highest figure in the past decade, and warns about the increase of international conflicts and humanitarian consequences.

(click on map to enlarge)

The world is experiencing a new upsurge in global armed violence. In 2025, 40 active armed conflicts were registered (37 in 2024), the highest number since 2011 and one of the highest since the School for a Culture of Peace (ECP) of the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona has been producing its annual reports on international conflict. This is one of the main conclusions of the report Alert 2026! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding, published on 3 June. The report is mainly based on qualitative analysis of studies and information provided by the United Nations, international organisations, research centres, media and NGOs, among others, as well as the experience acquired in field research.

According to the study, there were 40 armed conflicts and 113 scenarios of socio-political tension around the world in 2025. Africa continues to concentrate the highest number of wars (17), followed by Asia and the Pacific (12), and the Middle East (7), while Europe and America register two armed conflicts each.

Rise in international conflicts

The report particularly warns of the increase in international conflicts. In 2025, nine clearly internationalised wars were recorded, the highest number since the ECP uses its current classification methodology. Among the new armed conflicts identified are the confrontation between India and Pakistan, the serious escalation between Thailand and Cambodia, and the war between Israel, the United States and Iran, known in 2025 as the “12-day war” and which was reopened in 2026. The ECP research team warns that this evolution reflects a deterioration in global security and is a reflection of an international system in which many powerful actors do not prioritise prevention, addressing the root causes of disputes and supporting dialogue.

Sudan, Gaza, Haiti and Ukraine: worsening of the humanitarian situation

The report concludes that almost half of the world’s armed conflicts worsened during 2025. Among the most serious cases are the Western Sahel region, Sudan, Haiti, Somalia, Gaza, Myanmar and the war between Russia and Ukraine. The ECP warns of the increase in civilian casualties, the bombing of populated areas, the destruction of infrastructure and the violations of international humanitarian law.

(Continued in right column)

Question related to this article:

Where in the world are zones of peace?

(Continued from left column)

Setbacks in women’s rights

Coinciding with the 25th anniversary of UN Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, the report warns of a global backsliding in women’s rights. According to the study, 70% of the highest-intensity armed conflicts take place in countries with low or medium-low levels of gender equality. Twenty-three of the 40 armed conflicts that took place in 2025 took place in countries with low or medium-low levels of gender equality, and 16 of the 20 high-intensity armed conflicts in 2025 (80%) took place in countries where the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association had documented legislation or policies that criminalise LGBTIQ+ people.

Moreover, women’s participation in UN-led peace processes continues to decline. The UN verified more than 4,600 cases of conflict-related sexual violence in 2024, a 25% increase over the previous year. A total of 93% of the victims were women and girls.

Over 117 million forcibly displaced people

The report notes that forced displacement remains at historically high levels. In mid-2025, there were 117.3 million forcibly displaced people worldwide, including refugees and internally displaced persons. Although the figure represents a slight decrease from the previous year, partly attributed to the return of people to countries such as Syria, Afghanistan and Sudan, the ECP highlights that the overall volume remains extraordinarily high. Afghanistan, Syria, Sudan, Ukraine and Venezuela account for 65% of the world’s refugee population.

An internationally renowned report

Alert 2026!, which this year reaches its 25th edition, is one of the main yearbooks produced in Spain on conflict, human rights and peacebuilding. The study combines data from the United Nations, international organisations, research centres and specialised fieldwork. The objective of the report is to offer tools for analysis and preventive warnings to political leaders, international organisations, the media and actors involved in the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

UAB School for a Culture of Peace report: Alert 2026! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding

– – – – – –

If you wish to make a comment on this article, you may write to coordinator@cpnn-world.org with the title “Comment on (name of article)” and we will put your comment on line. Because of the flood of spam, we have discontinued the direct application of comments.

– – – – – –

(Click here for a Spanish version of this article)

Around the World, Global Solidarity and Cooperation Are Remarkably Popular

. . DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION . .

An essay by Lawrence Wittner in Foreign Policy in Focus

One of the curious ironies of our time is that, although many politicians spout heated nationalist rhetoric, rail against foreign nations, and belittle international cooperation, this approach to international affairs is not at all what most people want.

The climate of aggressive nationalism is clear enough. In nations around the globe, demagogues (usually of a rightwing variety) whip up xenophobia, preach superpatriotism, demand vast military buildups, and―if holding public office―often launch invasions of other nations under the banner of restoring an allegedly glorious national past.

But what is often overlooked is that, across the planet, most people favor a very different way of engaging with the world.

In late 2025, Focaldata, a major research company commissioned by the Rockefeller Foundation, conducted a landmark survey of 36,405 people across 34 countries. The resulting report, Demanding Results: Global Views on International Cooperation, revealed that 55 percent of people worldwide “believe their country should cooperate on global challenges even if it means compromising on national interests.” If international cooperation was proven to solve global problems, public support jumped to 75 percent. Respondents viewed such cooperation as essential for food and water security, jobs, health, trade, and climate.

Other opinion surveys confirm the widespread nature of internationalist sentiment. An Ipsos poll conducted between February and April 2026 found a substantial increase over the previous year in support for global solidarity and cooperation, with net disagreement shifting to net agreement. Among the more than 22,000 adults in the 31 countries surveyed, nearly two-thirds now supported the claim that, “for certain problems, like environmental pollution, international bodies should have the right to enforce solutions.” Some 42 percent (a plurality) agreed with the idea that “my taxes should go towards solving global problems.” And nearly four out of 10 respondents (a plurality) endorsed the statement: “I consider myself more a world citizen than a citizen of the country I live in.”

Another measure of the worldwide support for international cooperation is provided by polling on public attitudes toward international organizations. The Rockefeller Foundation-Focaldata study reported that public trust was strong for the United Nations (58 percent) and the World Health Organization (60 percent), although weaker for international financial institutions. The global popularity of the United Nations was also attested to by a Pew Research Center survey that appeared in September 2025. Covering 31,938 adults in 25 countries, it found that a median of 61 percent of adults had a favorable view of the world organization, while only 32 percent had an unfavorable one.

Even proposals for new, avant-garde global institutions have attracted more public support than opposition. Commissioned by Democracy Without Borders, Nira Data conducted a global survey in September 2025 of public attitudes toward the election of a citizen-elected world parliament to handle global issues. The survey, released in January 2026, drew upon 117,000 people in 101 countries that held 90 percent of the world’s population. The finding was that 40 percent of respondents approved of the world parliament idea, while only 27 percent opposed it.

(Article continued in right column)

Question related to this article:


How can we develop the institutional framework for a culture of peace?

(Article continued from left column)

But what about the United States? Surely in this flag-waving nation, engulfed in the rabid “America First” rhetoric of the Trump administration and its MAGA acolytes, no more than a small minority would support the ideals of global solidarity and cooperation.

But that’s not the case at all.

One of the most striking findings of the Rockefeller Foundation-Focaldata survey is that 61 percent of U.S. respondents believed that the United States should cooperate on global challenges even it meant compromising on some national interests.

When it came to the United Nations, the Pew Research Center report revealed that 57 percent of Americans held a positive view of the world organization, as compared to 41 percent with a negative one. Moreover, it found that positive views of the United Nations had increased by 5 percent over the preceding year.

A study by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, issued in September 2025, reported an even more favorable public attitude toward the United Nations. Two-thirds of the Americans surveyed, it noted, said that the United States should be more willing to make decisions within the framework of the United Nations, even if this meant that the country would sometimes have to go along with a policy that was not its first choice.

Admittedly, opinion surveys found that the level of support for international cooperation varied significantly from country to country. Thus, for example, the backing for international cooperation when that meant compromising on some national interests was greater in India (81 percent) and South Korea (73 percent), the countries highest on the scale, than in Argentina (41 percent) and Japan (34 percent), the countries at the bottom of the scale.

Furthermore, there was often a political dimension to worldwide public attitudes toward foreign affairs. According to the Pew Research Center, “people who place themselves on the left of the ideological spectrum are more likely than those on the right to have a positive view of the UN.”

This political division was particularly wide in the United States, where, as the Pew report maintained, “81 percent of liberals―versus 34 percent of conservatives―have a favorable opinion” of the United Nations. When it came to the issue of support for cooperation with other nations, the surveys by Rockefeller-Focaldata and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs both found substantial differences between the attitudes of Democrats (quite positive) and Republicans (far more negative).

Even so, in most countries, including the United States, support for international solidarity and cooperation is very substantial, and growing. Consequently, political activists and politicians shouldn’t be reluctant to speak out for them. Indeed, given the popularity of this internationalist approach to global affairs, it might even prove a winning political issue.

– – – – – –

If you wish to make a comment on this article, you may write to coordinator@cpnn-world.org with the title “Comment on (name of article)” and we will put your comment on line. Because of the flood of spam, we have discontinued the direct application of comments.

Labor Unions Celebrate World Court Ruling Enshrining Right to Strike

. . DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION . .

An article by Marjorie Cohn from Truthout (licensed under Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

The right to strike is under attack throughout the world, including in the United States. Labor strikes are currently forbidden or restricted in the majority of countries.

Now, in a landmark 43-page advisory opinion  issued May 21, the International Court of Justice (ICJ, or World Court) has determined that the right to strike is protected under the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise.


Bank employees and members of various trade unions gather at Azad Maidan as part of a nationwide Bharat Bandh, or general strike, on February 12, 2026, in Mumbai, India.

“At a moment when workers’ organizations face sustained attacks around the world, this opinion reaffirms that the freedom to withhold one’s labor is not a privilege granted by the powerful, but a fundamental human right grounded in international law,” AFL-CIO President Liz Shuler said in a statement.

The ILO  is the United Nations agency that sets global labor standards. It has 187 member states and has adopted 191 conventions since its founding in 1919. The ILO considers Convention No. 87 to be one of its 11 fundamental conventions.

In 2023, the ILO asked the ICJ to settle an internal dispute  about whether Convention No. 87 gives workers the right to strike, which is not specifically addressed in the convention. Although advisory opinions of the ICJ are not legally binding, many courts accept them as authoritative legal decisions.

The ICJ ruled in its 10-4 opinion that a strike “is one of the main activities engaged in and tools used by workers and their organizations to promote their interests and improve conditions of labour, thereby ensuring the effective exercise of the freedom of association protected under Convention No. 87.”

The Court found “that protection of the right to strike is encompassed in the protection of the freedom of association provided for in Convention No. 87.”

In reaching that conclusion, the Court considered provisions in two 1996 Covenants that contain relevant rules of international law regarding the right to strike. Both refer to Convention No. 87.

Article 8, paragraph 1 (d) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  (ICESCR) expressly protects the right to strike, if it is exercised in conformity with domestic laws.

Article 22, paragraph 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  (ICCPR) provides for the right to freedom of association. The ICJ noted that for more than 25 years, the Human Rights Committee — which monitors the implementation of the ICCPR — has considered the right to strike to be encompassed in the protection of freedom of association.

Due to the high degree of overlap between the states parties to the ICESCR and ICCPR, and Convention No. 87, the ICJ determined there was a common understanding among them on the right to strike. The Court thus concluded “that an interpretation taking into account the relevant rules of international law contained in the ICESCR and the ICCPR indicates that the protection of the right to strike is encompassed in the protection of the freedom of association provided by Convention No. 87.”

No Right to Organize Without the Right to Strike

“For generations, working people have understood a simple truth: The freedom to join a union means nothing if you cannot withhold your labor when bosses refuse to listen. Now, the world’s highest court has affirmed that truth,” said Jeffrey Vogt, director of the International Lawyers Assisting Workers (ILAW) Network, which issued the call for the ILO referral of this case to the ICJ.

The ICJ decision “affirms decades of judicial precedent and what workers around the world know: there is no right to organize and bargain collectively without the right to strike,” Shuler said in her statement. “When workers are barred from taking collective action on the job, they cannot defend their rights and demand the workplace conditions and contracts they are owed. The freedom to join a union becomes an empty formality.”

“This is an important day for the International Labor Organization [ILO], and for its continued relevance in the world of work. However, the significance of this opinion extends well beyond the institutional context in Geneva,” the ILAW Network wrote in a statement.

The ICJ advisory opinion came “at a moment of acute pressure on the international labour rights system,” ILAW stated. “Across the world, the right to strike is under sustained attack — through restrictive legislation, expansive judicial interpretation of essential services, the criminalisation of trade union activity, and the use of dismissals, injunctions, and damages claims to deter collective action.”

Legal restrictions on the right to strike are increasing. In 2022, strikes were outlawed or stringently restricted in 129 of the 148 countries tallied by the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), one of the six organizations with consultative status at the ILO Governing Body.

The ITUC, which represents 191 million workers in 169 countries and territories, is dedicated to trade union democracy and independence. It has regional organizations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The ICJ decision “is important not only for workers and trade unions, but also for governments and responsible businesses,” ITUC stressed.

This decision “will serve as a powerful interpretive tool before national constitutional and labour courts, before regional human rights bodies, and before the ILO’s own supervisory bodies,” ILAW noted. “It strengthens the hand of every worker and union challenging strike bans, broad essential-services designations, criminal sanctions against strikers, prohibitions on solidarity and political strikes, and the dismissal and blacklisting of workers who exercise this right.”

(article continued in right column)

Question related to this article:
 
What is the contribution of trade unions to the culture of peace?

(article continued from left column)

Ruling Will Affect Tens of Millions of Workers

In October, 18 countries and five international organizations, including the ILO, presented oral testimony before the ICJ, and other nations filed written contributions. The majority of participants supported the right to strike, which is guaranteed in most European countries.

Bolivian miners march through La Paz on May 31, 2026 in opposition to the austerity policies of President Rodrigo Paz. (Photo by COB Central Obrera Boliviana/Facebook) From Common Dreams re-publication of this article.

Harold Koh, who represented the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) before the ICJ, told the judges that the case would “affect the real rights of tens of millions of working people around the world.” If the Court ruled that the Convention didn’t protect the right to strike, Koh warned, “National employer groups would contest the right to strike country by country, focusing first on nations with compliant courts, weak civil societies and ineffective media.”

Jeffrey Vogt worked with the legal team of the ITUC on the briefs and oral arguments presented to the ICJ. Vogt’s co-authored book, The Right to Strike in International Law, provided a legal roadmap for the case.

Vogt told Truthout that “the written view of the U.S. (under the Biden administration) was to support the right to strike, albeit on narrower grounds than what we had argued. When the Trump administration came in, they withdrew the Biden era brief but fortunately did not appear for oral arguments and take a contrary view.”

“The decision deals with the right to strike in the abstract — does the convention protect it — but does not go into the modalities,” Vogt added. The Court wrote that its “conclusion that the right to strike is protected by Convention No. 87 does not entail any determination on the precise content, scope, or conditions for the exercise of that right.”

“That was a conscious decision,” Vogt noted. “We did not want the court to attempt to define the scope, especially since we believe that is the proper role of the ILO supervisory system.” Vogt said that “the ICJ gave ‘great weight’ to the views of the supervisory system, which is helpful.” And although “the ILO has supported secondary strikes,” in which workers strike in solidarity with other workers at a different employer, the ICJ decision didn’t opine on that specific issue.

The Right to Strike in the U.S.

“The right to withhold one’s labor, inherent in the right to strike, belongs to all workers, but it has been restricted,” Jeanne Mirer, a labor lawyer in private practice working with the International Commission for Labor Rights, told Truthout. “Many unions have agreed never to strike while a collective bargaining agreement is in effect.”

Most private sector workers in the U.S. have the right to strike under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Employees, including international and undocumented workers, cannot be fired or disciplined for participating in a lawful strike.

“Those exempted from the NLRA, such as agricultural and domestic workers, are not restricted in the right to strike but have no protections against discharge if they strike and do not have the power to prevent such retaliation,” Mirer added.

Some states have their own laws granting protection to domestic workers and 14 states guarantee farmworkers collective bargaining rights.

Railroad and airline workers are not covered by the NLRA, but they come under the Railway Labor Act, which has several limitations on the right to strike.

In recent years, Congress and the courts have narrowed the definition of “protected concerted activity” under the NLRA. Union membership is dropping. Nevertheless, strike actions in the U.S. increased by almost 50 percent in 2022, according to the Economic Policy Institute.

In 2023, the U.S. Supreme Court weakened the legal protections for striking in Glacier Northwest, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, making it easier for employers to sue unions in state courts. Only Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson dissented, writing, “The right to strike is fundamental to American labor law.” She noted:

“Workers are not indentured servants, bound to continue laboring until any planned work stoppage would be as painless as possible for their masters. They are employees whose collective and peaceful decision to withhold their labor is protected by the [National Labor Relations Act] even if economic injury results.”

The NLRA’s protections for private sector workers don’t extend to public sector employees. “Public employees in the United States have been restricted in many ways from striking,” Mirer said.

Federal workers are legally prohibited from striking. Thirty-six states prohibit public sector workers from striking. Three other states that haven’t addressed the issue would likely outlaw public sector strikes as well. In the 12 states where strikes are not per se unlawful, various preconditions must be met before workers can engage in strikes.

The World Federation of Trade Unions, which played a decisive role in the creation of Convention No. 87 in 1948, applauded the ICJ’s decision:

“It is clear that the existence of a class-oriented and militant trade union movement is the essential, decisive, and irreplaceable factor to ensure that the right to strike, as well as conventions, collective bargaining, labor laws, and workers’ achievements, are not merely empty words on paper but are implemented in practice. The WFTU reiterates its call for struggle in every country, sector, and workplace to safeguard the sacred right to strike in practice.”

“It is up to workers and their organizations to build on the ICJ decision to ensure the right to strike can be an effective tool to build worker power,” Mirer said.

– – – – – –

If you wish to make a comment on this article, you may write to coordinator@cpnn-world.org with the title “Comment on (name of article)” and we will put your comment on line. Because of the flood of spam, we have discontinued the direct application of comments.

Indigenous Leaders Call for Global Recognition of Peacebuilding Role as UN Forum Echoes Summit Outcomes

. . SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT . .

An article from the Women Survivors Network

 Indigenous leaders, diplomats and United Nations officials convened in New York for the Second Global Summit on Indigenous Peacebuilding, issuing a call to reframe global peace and security efforts by placing Indigenous Peoples at the center of conflict prevention and resolution.

Held in New York City on April 25–26, 2026, the two-day summit gathered 300 representatives from 80 countries and seven socio-cultural regions of the world amid growing concern that a majority of the world’s conflicts occur in biodiversity-rich areas inhabited by Indigenous Peoples.

Organizers said the summit has already influenced international policy discussions. The United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues referenced the event and its recommendations in its 2026 outcome document, including a proposal to declare 2027–2037 an International Decade of Indigenous Peacebuilding.

Opening the Summit, Binalakshmi Nepram, Founder-Director of Manipur Women Gun Survivors Network and President of the Global Alliance of Indigenous Peoples, Gender Justice and Peace, called for a fundamental shift: “It is time to move from seeing Indigenous Peoples as victims of conflict to recognizing them as experts, mediators, and negotiators of peace.”

The Summit built on the outcomes of the first global gathering, which led to the first-ever declaration on Indigenous Peacebuilding and the creation of a Global Network of Indigenous Peacebuilders, Mediators and Negotiators to help resolve some of the world’s most entrenched conflicts.

A series of global initiatives were launched at the gathering, including the Global Indigenous Mothers March for Peace, Healing and Unity, the recognition of an innovative and much-needed Indigenous Humanitarian Peacebuilding (IHP) Model to respond directly to survivors in war and conflict zones,  a forthcoming book on Indigenous Peacebuilding, and the rollout of online and in-person curriculum programs to train Indigenous peacebuilders worldwide.

A central feature of the summit was the Weaving for Peace exhibition, which brought together traditional textiles from Indigenous communities across Manipur, Guatemala, Papua New Guinea, Bolivia, the Haudenosaunee, the Sámi region, Maasai Regions, Amazon and the Sahel, highlighting cultural resilience as a foundation for peace.

(article continued in right column)

Question related to this article:

Indigenous peoples, Are they the true guardians of nature?

(article continued from left column)

Speakers pointed to rising global displacement—estimated at around 200 million people—with many conflicts linked to resource extraction, environmental degradation and transnational organized crime affecting Indigenous territories with huge humanitarian consequence.  Aluki Kotierk, Chair of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, underscored the role of Indigenous knowledge systems rooted in balance and reciprocity. “Indigenous Peoples must be recognized not as security threats, but as part of the security infrastructure,” said Dr Albert Barume, United Nations Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Issues, framing Indigenous peacebuilding as a matter of international peace and security.

Justin Mohammad, Ambassador for First Nations People, Australia, said Indigenous diplomacy has long shaped relations across regions and should be integrated into modern peace processes.

“When multilateral institutions are being questioned, we need governance—but we must humanize it,” said Laura Gil, Assistant Secretary General of the Organization of American States. Omar Hilale, Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations and Chair of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, emphasized the need for inclusive peacebuilding approaches that incorporate Indigenous knowledge and local leadership.

Laura Flores Director of Americas Division of the United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs also joined and stated, “member states are increasingly recognizing Indigenous Peoples’ role in peacebuilding, including through a landmark resolution on Indigenous Peoples’ rights and their role in peacebuilding, negotiations, and transitional justice.”

Ana Pérez Conguache, representing the Guatemala Presidential Commission, highlighted the importance of addressing land rights, inequality and historical injustices as part of sustainable peace.Ambassador David Lametti, Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations also spoke at the Summit pledging support for Indigenous Peacebuilding.

Many scholars and leaders from conflict affected regions such as Dr Noni Arambam, Maisnam Arnapal, Adam Kuleit Ole Mwarabu, Daniel Mastaki from DRC, Nuba Mountain and many others also spoke. Participants concluded with a shared message: that the world’s Indigenous Peoples are the world’s peacemakers; that wars and conflicts currently engineered in Indigenous territories must end immediately; and that Indigenous Peoples who are displaced must be protected.

That justice, inclusion, and the leadership of Indigenous Peoples—their peacemaking and their wisdom—hold the key for healing people, for peace and the planet, and it’s time UN member states and the world realize and ensure this in policy, planning, action, and resourcing.

– – – – – –

If you wish to make a comment on this article, you may write to coordinator@cpnn-world.org with the title “Comment on (name of article)” and we will put your comment on line. Because of the flood of spam, we have discontinued the direct application of comments.

Women, Peace and Security Index 2025-2026

. WOMEN’S EQUALITY . .

Sections on individual indicators from the Women, Peace and Security Index 2025-2026

Indicator performance has improved little since the 2023/24 WPS Index

Inclusion indicators

With the exception of some high performers, women’s average years of schooling
remain alarmingly low. The global average for the education indicator (average
number of years of schooling for women ages 25 and older) stands at 8.4
years, four years short of completing secondary education in most countries. The top performers, where women receive over 12 years of schooling on average, are countries classified as high income and with very high Human Development Index rankings. Low-income and low Human Development Index countries rank at the bottom on this indicator, with just over three years of schooling. The Sub-Saharan Africa region and the Fragile
States group score at the bottom, with an average of 5.3 years of schooling.
On average, girls in 33 countries receive less than five years of schooling.


The United States and Germany are tied for the highest average years
of schooling, at 14, while Somalia, classified as a Fragile State, has the
lowest average, at 0.9 year. The Middle East and North Africa region has
the widest range of performance on this indicator, from 13.4 years in the
United Arab Emirates to 0.9 year in Somalia. Lebanon is the best performing among the Fragile States group, with roughly 13.1 years of schooling, the only country in that group to place in the top quintile for this indicator.

Sub-Saharan Africa performs exceedingly well on women’s employment, while
the Middle East and North Africa and South Asia perform poorly. The global
average for the employment indicator (the percentage of women ages 25–64
who are employed) is 56 percent, ranging from 24 percent of women
employed in the Middle East and North Africa region to 73 percent in
the Developed Countries group. A close second is Sub-Saharan Africa,
at 71 percent. Iceland is the only country in the Developed Countries
group that ranks in the top 10 on women’s employment. However, the
range across countries in the group is narrow, with most countries ranking
high on employment even if they are not in the top 10. Burundi, classified
as a Fragile State, is tied as the highest-ranking country in the world on this
indicator, with roughly 90 percent of women employed. Half of the 10 top-ranked countries on this indicator are in Sub-Saharan Africa (Burundi, Tanzania, Nigeria, Benin, and Togo), including two classified as Fragile States (Burundi and Nigeria). São Tomé and Principe is the only country in that region with fewer than a third of women employed.

While high rates of employment are an important indicator of women’s status, the global datasets we use do not capture working conditions and unpaid care burdens that women manage (see appendix 1 for details on the data sources we use). For example, highest-ranking Burundi has the largest share of women (roughly 95 percent) employed in the informal economy, especially in agriculture. Employment may also not translate
into higher standards of living; almost two-thirds of Burundi’s population
lives below the 2017 poverty line of $2.15 a day, nearly the same share as
eight years ago when the inaugural WPS Index was produced. While most
Burundian women work in small-scale farming jobs, men are more likely
to work in higher revenue-generating industrial agricultural enterprises.
Thus, the concentration of women’s employment in the informal sector is
evidence of the continuing need to improve women’s inclusion, even as
women’s high employment rates represent gains in their status and social
acceptance of women’s employment.

The Middle East and North Africa is the worst-performing region, with more than three in four women unemployed. Low labor force participation by women reflects a combination of structural and legal barriers— such as slow industrialization, male-dominated oil economies, discriminatory family laws, and lack of childcare or maternity support—that restrict both the supply of and demand for women’s labor. These barriers are reinforced by high unemployment among educated women, weak private sector job creation, and persistent patriarchal norms that discourage women’s employment. South Asia is the second-worst performing region and, along with the Middle East and North Africa, the only region where fewer than half of women are employed (39 percent). Despite some favorable laws, women’s low employment in South Asia reflects a lack of supportive infrastructure, such as childcare, eldercare, safe transport, inclusive workplaces, and re-entry opportunities, combined with education gaps, limited access to finance, and restrictive social norms.

Minor changes in other indicators of inclusion. The global average for cellphone
use
(percentage of women and girls ages 15 or older who report having a
cellphone) increased from 80 percent in the 2023/24 WPS Index to 84 percent. The Developed Countries group is the best performing, at 96 percent, and South Asia is the worst performing, at roughly 65 percent, up from 55 percent in the 2023/24 WPS Index. In seven countries, less than half of women report having their own cellphone (Chad, Ethiopia, Niger, Afghanistan, Madagascar, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and
Pakistan). As mentioned, Pakistan is the only country in which fewer
than a third of women have their own cellphone.

Globally, average parliamentary representation (percentage of parliamentary seats held by women) declined slightly, from 26 percent in 2023/24 to 24 percent. The Latin America and the Caribbean region performs best, with women filling roughly 33 percent of parliamentary seats on average. South Asia is the worst-performing region, at roughly 16 percent, displacing the Middle East and North Africa, whose score improved from 15 percent in the 2023/24 WPS Index to 18 percent.

There are limited updates to the financial inclusion indicator (percentage of women and girls ages 15 years or older with an account at a financial institution). The Middle East and North Africa region performs worst on this
indicator, at 28 percent. The average rate for the Fragile States group, which
was the worst-performing region in the 2023 Index, has remained the same
(34 percent). In six countries worldwide, less than 10 percent of women have
access to their own bank account: South Sudan, Afghanistan, Yemen,
Burundi, Djibouti, and Central African Republic. South Sudan is the
lowest-ranking country globally on this indicator, with only 4 percent of
women having access to their own bank account. Eight of the ten bottomranking countries on this indicator are classified as Fragile States. The exceptions are Pakistan, at 14 percent, and Djibouti, at 9 percent.

Justice indicators

Mixed performances on barriers to justice. The global score on absence of legal
discrimination (a measure of the differences between men’s and women’s legal access to economic opportunities, from 0, worst, to 100, best)
improved slightly, from 75.7 on the 2023/24 WPS Index to 76.1. Fourteen
countries have a perfect score of 100, all except one (Latvia) in the Developed Countries group. Seven of the bottom dozen countries on this indicator are classified as Fragile States, and all except one of these Fragile States (Afghanistan) are in the Middle East and North Africa region, which is the worst-performing region on this indicator on the current WPS Index (as it was on the 2023/24 WPS Index).

Performance ranges widely on the related access to justice indicator (an ordinal measure of women’s ability to enjoy equal, secure, and effective access
to justice, from 0, worst, to 4, best). Denmark once again ranks highest on
the indicator, with a score of 3.958, more than 40 times higher than bottomranking Nicaragua, with a score of .097. Nicaragua displaced Afghanistan,
which was the lowest performer on this indicator in the 2023/24 WPS Index.
Nicaragua’s score plunged 85 percent from its score of .659 on the 2023/24
WPS Index, a large drop that may reflect the deterioration of judicial independence following the February 2025 constitutional reforms driven by President Daniel Ortega. These included eliminating the separation of powers and positioning the judiciary branch under direct executive influence of the new co-presidency of President Ortega and his wife. Key legal protections have been removed, including references to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the prohibition against gender-based wage discrimination. Women face heightened risks, and dissenters are threatened with loss
of citizenship. Afghanistan also deteriorated on the access to justice indicator, with its score falling from .372 on the 2023/24 WPS Index to .160.

Eight of the ten highest-ranking countries on the access to justice indicator are in the Developed Countries group, whose average score on this
indicator is 3.5. No other region has an average above 2.2. The second-best
performing regions are Latin America and the Caribbean and SubSaharan Africa, tied with an average score of 2.2. Latin America and the Caribbean’s improved standing may be explained by the almost 5 percent rise in its average score for this indicator from the 2023/24 WPS Index, together with declines in scores for Central and Eastern Europe and
Central Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, and South Asia. Countries in
the Latin America and the Caribbean region also have the widest range of
scores on this indicator, with best performing Costa Rica (3.540) scoring 36
times higher than worst-performing Nicaragua (.097).

The Fragile States group performs worst overall on the access to justice
indicator, with a score of 1.8, followed closely by the Middle East and
North Africa. The average score for the Middle East and North Africa,
the lowest ranked region on this indicator in the 2023/24 WPS Index,
rose from 1.7 to 1.9. The increase reflects improvements in several countries’ scores, including Egypt (up 37 percent), Algeria (17 percent), Qatar
(12 percent), Palestine (11 percent), Yemen (4 percent, and no longer in
the bottom 10 countries for this indicator), and Iraq (2 percent, and no
longer in the bottom 20).

It makes intuitive sense that the absence of legal discrimination and
access to justice indicators are strongly connected, since few formal legal
protections for women would typically mean that women also have a limited ability to safely pursue justice (and vice versa). Figure 6.3 visualizes
the normalized scores of these two justice indicators, with the overlapping
patterns reaffirming the positive relation between them. Nonetheless, there
are some outlier countries that score high on one indicator and low on
the other. As on the 2023/24 WPS Index, Nicaragua and El Salvador
have high scores on the absence of legal discrimination (86.3 and 88.8,
respectively) indicator but low scores on access to justice (.097 and .792,
respectively).

Worsening conflict and aid cuts threaten to undo gains in the maternal mortality ratio. The global average maternal mortality ratio (an indicator of mothers’ risk of death from a single pregnancy) improved from 212 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2023/24 to approximately 188. Nigeria has the highest maternal mortality ratio in the world, with 993 deaths per 100,000 live births.

Belarus and Norway continue to have the lowest maternal mortality ratio, improving to 1 death per 100,000 live births. The Developed Countries group performs the best on this indicator, with an average of 10 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births. The United States has the worst maternal mortality ratio among countries in the Developed Countries group (box 6.1).

The Fragile States group has the highest maternal mortality ratio among regions, with an average of 457 deaths per 100,000 live births. Seven of the ten lowest-ranking countries on this indicator are classified as Fragile States, and five of these are in Sub-Saharan Africa. Recent research also reaffirms that armed conflict is associated with increases in maternal and child deaths globally. For instance, research focusing on the Tigray region of Ethiopia found that maternal outcomes deteriorate severely in rural areas during wartime, likely due to disruptions in healthcare infrastructure.

(continued in right column)

Question related to this article:
 
Prospects for progress in women’s equality, what are the short and long term prospects?

(continued from left column)

However, since the 2023/24 WPS Index, maternal mortality ratios have
improved for both the Sub-Saharan Africa region (down from 507 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births to 437) and the Fragile States group
(down from 540 to 457). South Sudan, which was the worst-performing
country on this indicator in the 2023/24 WPS Index, with 1,223 maternal
deaths per 100,000 live births, has nearly halved that number to 692. South
Sudan’s improvement may be attributed to the gradual increase in midwife
training throughout the country, supported by organizational efforts such
as the establishment of the Catholic Health Training Institute in 2010
and UNFPA support of mobile health clinics and community outreach programs that provide perinatal care. Additional efforts are ongoing, with
the World Health Organization (WHO) and South Sudan’s Ministry of
Health collaborating in 2024 to develop guidelines and training resources
on maternal health for healthcare workers.

Despite substantial progress over the past two decades, the WHO reported
that Sub-Saharan Africa, grappling with high rates of poverty and multiple
armed conflicts, still accounted for about 70 percent of maternal deaths
worldwide in 2023. Recent maternal mortality data also reveal the detrimental impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, with an estimated 40,000 more
deaths in 2021 than in 2020, driven by health complications from Covid-19
and widespread disruptions to maternity services, underscoring the need
to maintain essential care during crises such as pandemics. Global maternal mortality ratios began to improve in the two years after the pandemic,
returning to the falling trend of earlier years.

Globally, maternal deaths dropped 40 percent between 2000 and 2023,
but progress has slowed notably since 2016, with almost one woman dying
every two minutes in 2023 from pregnancy- or childbirth-related complications. And now there is a risk of reversals, as deep cuts in humanitarian funding in 2025 are severely undermining maternal and child health
services. In many areas, maternal and child health facilities have closed,
the number of health workers has declined, and supply chains for lifesaving medicines have been disrupted.

Especially at risk are women in countries that are heavily dependent on
humanitarian assistance, such as those classified as Fragile States, where
maternal mortality ratios are already high. For instance, a 2025 UN report
estimated that the likelihood of maternal death is 400 times greater in
Sub-Saharan Africa than in Australia and New Zealand. The highest risks are in countries ranked the worst on the maternal mortality ratio
indicator: Nigeria (181st), Chad (180th), Central African Republic
(178th tie), South Sudan (178th tie), Liberia (177th), Somalia (176th),
and Afghanistan (175th). Researchers at Stanford University have estimated that reductions in development assistance to low-resource countries that last five years or longer can reverse 64 percent of the progress in
maternal mortality. Health and dignity are not only basic human rights,
but they are also central to women’s participation and protection under the
WPS Agenda. Urgent and sustained action is needed from all countries to
preserve and increase the gains in maternal mortality.

Security indicators

Despite some improvements, less than two-thirds of women worldwide report
feeling safe walking at night in their communities. Community safety (the percentage of women who report feeling safe walking alone at night in their
community) has improved slightly, rising from 64 percent globally on the
2023/24 WPS Index to 66 percent. But that means more than one-third of
women feel unsafe walking alone at night in their communities. Singapore is the highest-ranking country on this indicator, with 97 percent of
women feeling safe walking alone at night, while Syrian Arab Republic
is the lowest-ranking country at 17 percent—and the only country where
fewer than one in four women feels safe walking alone at night.

Among regions, East Asia and the Pacific again performs best, with
84 percent of women reporting feeling safe walking in their community at
night (compared with 83 percent in the 2023/24 WPS Index), while Latin
America and the Caribbean again performs worst, at 42 percent (40 percent in 2023/24). El Salvador is the only country in the Latin America and
the Caribbean region to score above the global average, with 85 percent
of women reporting that they feel safe walking alone at night. In 16 of 27
countries in the region, more than half the women report feeling unsafe
walking alone at night.

In 31 of the 37 countries classified as Fragile States, fewer than two-thirds of women feel safe walking alone at night. In a majority of countries
(23) in the Sub-Saharan Africa region, that share shrinks to fewer than
half. Syrian Arab Republic has the worst performance globally on this
indicator, with less than a quarter of women feeling safe walking alone at
night. The second-worst performers on the community safety indicator are
South Africa and Afghanistan, at 25 percent each. In Afghanistan, the
Taliban continues to restrict women’s mobility, including prohibitions on
visiting parks and even health centers.

Community safety is one of the few indicators on which the Developed Countries group does not perform best. Its score of 65 percent puts it behind the East Asia and the Pacific region, at 84. Nine countries in the Developed Countries group are below the global average of 66 percent: Israel (63 percent), Canada (63 percent), Belgium (63 percent), the United States (58 percent), Malta (56 percent), Australia (52 percent), Greece (51 percent), New Zealand (47 percent), and Italy (44 percent). Just behind the Developed Countries group are the Middle East and North Africa and South Asia regions, both at just under 65 percent. Eleven countries in the Middle East and North Africa score above the global average on community safety, with more than two-thirds of women
feeling safe walking alone at night.

Perceptions of community safety also vary within countries, with vulnerable groups often feeling more unsafe. For instance, a 2024 study for
Brazil found that perceptions of safety among women have deteriorated
more in rural areas than in urban areas, especially for non-White populations, a finding the study links to an erosion of trust in police services.
In the United States, there is a notable racial difference in perceptions of
safety, with fewer than half of Black women (46 percent) feeling safe walking alone at night, compared with 58 percent of women overall. Only
two-thirds of Black women in the United States believe they would be
treated fairly or with respect by local police, and one-fourth report having
experienced discriminatory treatment in the past year, higher than that of
Black men (one-fifth).

Political violence targeting women shows little improvement. Globally, political violence targeting women (violent and politically motivated events targeting women) improved from 0.080 event per 100,000 women in the 2023/24 WPS Index to 0.070 event in the current one. While this indicator captures “the use of force by a group with a political purpose or motivation” in targeting women (physical violence or attempt at physical violence), it does not capture the full scope of political violence targeting women. For instance, it does not include intimidation, threats, or online or technologyfacilitated gender-based violence, all of which can have serious implications for women’s safety and their ability to participate in politics and in peace and security efforts.

The Latin America and the Caribbean region continues to have
the highest rate of political violence targeting women, despite a reduction from 0.381 event per 100,000 women on the 2023/24 WPS Index to
0.338 on the current one. The region also has the second-highest share of
women living in proximity to conflict (up from 44 percent to 47 percent).
When considered along with the region’s performance at the bottom of
the regional rankings on community safety, these results reinforce the
relationship between feelings of safety at the local level and instability
at the societal level. The second-worst performing region on this indicator is the Fragile States group, at 0.212 event per 100,000 women. The
Middle East and North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa regions performed slightly better, at roughly 0.130 event per 100,000 women. The
other country groups have an average rate ranging from 0.006 event
per 100,000 women (Developed Countries) to roughly 0.020 for three
regions (Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, East Asia
and the Pacific, and South Asia).

Seven of the ten bottom-ranking countries on the political violence targeting women indicator are in the Latin America and the Caribbean region,
and only one of those (Haiti) is classified as a Fragile State. Trinidad and
Tobago is the worst-performing country globally on this indicator, with
3.017 events per 100,000 women. The next lowest ranked country is Belize,
with 1.452 events, which makes Trinidad and Tobago an outlier on this
indicator. Trinidad and Tobago has a history of high rates of political violence targeting women, with 8 events per 100,000 women in the 2019/20
WPS Index, rising nearly fourfold to 23 events in the 2023/24 WPS Index.
That large increase may be related to the island country’s very small population, intensifying gang violence that led the government to declare a state
of emergency in December 2024, and the second-highest score worldwide
on a measure of the geographic diffusion of conflict.

Eleven countries in the Fragile States group have 0.000 reported events
of political violence targeting women, a hopeful sign that such violence
can be controlled even in contexts of fragility and conflict. Kosovo’s rate
of 0.000 events may reflect targeted interventions and women’s leadership. For instance, discussions on political violence targeting women and
its consequences for women’s representation were spurred in Kosovo by
initiatives such as the EmPOWER Local Women Politicians Program, a
capacity-building program sponsored by the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe that offers leadership workshops, civic engagement
opportunities, and cross-party collaboration for women in politics. As a
result of such efforts, women parliamentarians led their fellow lawmakers
in developing and endorsing an official declaration in 2024 that calls for
accountability and the safeguarding of women’s full participation in electoral spheres.35
Despite these positive signs, women in 94 countries are still subjected
to political violence. They range from the United Kingdom, with 0.003
event per 100,000 women, to five countries (Palestine, Cameroon,
Jamaica, Belize, and Trinidad and Tobago) where events exceed 1 per
100,000 women.

Finally, political violence targeting women does not affect all women in
the same way or to the same degree, and a lack of reporting does not necessarily mean a lack of occurrence. The United States is an example of how
these limitations can affect our understanding of this indicator. The country’s score on this indicator fell from 0.025 event per 100,000 women in the
2023/24 WPS Index to 0.006 in the current one. However, a recent study
found high levels of political violence targeting women during the 2024
US election cycle, with Black women 7 times more likely to be targeted by
hate speech than Black men, 3 times more likely than White women, and
18 times more likely than White men.

(Editor’s note: Cuba was one of 18 countries that were not included in their report because data was lacking on several indicators. Elsewhere in the report, it is noted that Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Rwanda are the only countries with more than 50% women in parliament. Other countries not listed come from the Caribbean (6), Pacific Islands (2), tiny European states (4), tiny Asian states (2). Also North Korea, Eritrea and Equatorial Guinea.)

– – – – – –

If you wish to make a comment on this article, you may write to coordinator@cpnn-world.org with the title “Comment on (name of article)” and we will put your comment on line. Because of the flood of spam, we have discontinued the direct application of comments.

UN General Assembly resolution: Interreligious Dialogue as Soft Power Peace Tool

FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION

Excerpt from an article of United Nations News Service

The Assembly adopted by consensus [on May 20] the draft resolution titled “Promotion of interreligious and intercultural dialogue, understanding and cooperation for peace” (document A/80/L.43) aimed at advancing interreligious and intercultural dialogue as a practical tool for peace, inclusion and sustainable development, supported by education, policy, partnerships and global cooperation.

Introducing the biennial text, the representative of Pakistan, also speaking on behalf of the Philippines and all co-sponsors, stressed that it is essential to promote a culture of peace — one that embraces diversity and inclusivity, safeguards fundamental rights and freedoms and rejects social structures and stereotypes that create divisions among individuals, societies, communities and nation States.

Question(s) related to this article:

What is the United Nations doing for a culture of peace?

Despite progress achieved over the years, he noted, much more remains to be done to fully realize these shared ideals.  In this regard, he recalled the Constitution of United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which affirms that “since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed”.  He explained that “a technical rollover” would retain the key messages reaffirmed through the consensus adoption of the resolution during the seventy‑eighth session.

Despite the unanimous adoption, several delegations raised some concerns. Among them was the representative of the United States, who said that the Assembly “spends countless hours negotiating symbolic, repetitive text with little to show in tangible results for the common citizen”.  Washington, D.C., she added, “is finished with performative exercises and bloated ideological multilateralism that fails to advance the core mission of the United Nations”.

(Editor’s note: The resolution was proposed by Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines and Turkmenistan. Its operative paragraphs include the following:)

Calls upon Member States, which have the primary responsibility to counter discrimination and hate speech, and all relevant actors, including political and religious leaders, to promote inclusion and unity to combat racism, xenophobia, hate speech, violence and discrimination.

– – – – – –

If you wish to make a comment on this article, you may write to coordinator@cpnn-world.org with the title “Comment on (name of article)” and we will put your comment on line. Because of the flood of spam, we have discontinued the direct application of comments.

May Day Demonstrations Worldwide Condemn US-Israeli War on Iran, Champion Workers

. . DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION . .

An article by Brad Reed from Common Dreams (licensed under Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 3.0)

May Day demonstrations across the world on Friday denounced the US-Israeli war against Iran, which has caused a global energy crisis that is disproportionately harming working-class people.

Among the earliest May Day demonstrations took place in the Philippines, and a video published  by The Associated Press shows protesters clashing with police near the US Embassy in the capital city of Manila.


Workers in the Philippines clash with police

While many demonstrators held signs that referenced local issues, American foreign policy was also a major focus of the protesters, as marchers in Manila carried a large banner that read, “Down With US Imperialism.”

Josua Mata, leader of the SENTRO umbrella group of labor federations, told  The Associated Press that the war with Iran was a central focus of protests because of the impact it’s had on energy costs.

“Every Filipino worker now is aware that the situation here is deeply connected to the global crisis,” Mata explained.

Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto attended a May Day rally held in the capital of Jakarta, where Jakarta Globe reported  that he announced a host of worker-friendly policies including plans “to build daycare facilities for workers’ children and accelerate the construction of at least 1 million homes.”


Workers’ demonstration in Jakarta, Indonesia

Question related to this article:
 
What is the contribution of trade unions to the culture of peace?

(article continued from left column)

France 24 reported  that hundreds of demonstrators in Istanbul, Turkey were arrested after attempting to march to the city’s iconic Taksim Square, which police had sealed off.

The Turkish Contemporary Lawyers’ Association (ÇHD) said  on Friday afternoon that at least 350 demonstrators in Istanbul have been detained as a result of the protests, with hundreds more potentially in custody.


May Day protests in Istanbul

May Day demonstrations are also taking place across Europe, with many demonstrators blaming US President Donald Trump’s war for the deterioration of workers’ living standards.

The European Trade Union Confederation, which represents 93 trade union organizations in 41 European countries, released a statement declaring that “working people refuse to pay the price for Donald Trump’s war in the Middle East,” adding that “today’s rallies show working people will not stand by and see their jobs and living standards destroyed.”


May Day demonstration in Madrid (Photo by Fernando Sanchez/Europa Press via Getty Images)

Trump is also facing protests at home, with more than 4,000 “May Day Strong” events planned across the United States.

Daniel Bertossa, general secretary for Public Services International, said  this year’s May Day demonstrations are providing a desperately needed backlash to power grabs being made by the global billionaire class.

Bertossa pointed to the US-Israel attack on Iran, as well as Trump’s repeated threats to invade Greenland, as key turning points that have pushed workers to organize and fight back.

“Rising living costs caused by the war are now driving anger among working-class people and producing a rare and powerful moment to connect and educate,” said Bertossa. “Fascists don’t have the answers to the economic pain they exploited to get elected—international affairs impact us all—and international working-class solidarity matters
.”
Bertossa added that “May Day is a vivid reminder that working-class politics is not a spectator sport,” and “we have never won by watching, waiting, or relying on great power leaders to gift us our future.”

– – – – – –

If you wish to make a comment on this article, you may write to coordinator@cpnn-world.org with the title “Comment on (name of article)” and we will put your comment on line. Because of the flood of spam, we have discontinued the direct application of comments.