{"id":37672,"date":"2026-01-24T18:13:15","date_gmt":"2026-01-24T17:13:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/english.cpnn-world.org\/?p=37672"},"modified":"2026-01-24T18:13:52","modified_gmt":"2026-01-24T17:13:52","slug":"iran-protests-2026-our-surveys-show-iranians-agree-more-on-regime-change-than-what-might-come-next","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/english.cpnn-world.org\/?p=37672","title":{"rendered":"Iran protests 2026: our surveys show Iranians agree more on regime change than what might come\u00a0next"},"content":{"rendered":"
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FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION<\/p>\n

An article dated January 12 from The Conversation<\/a><\/p>\n

Iranians have shown a willingness to pay a devastating price for political change, as protest has consistently been met by the Islamic Republic with violence and mass killing. The death toll since Iranians took to the streets on December 28\u00a0has reportedly passed 500<\/a>, with more than 10,000 arrested. Incoming reports put the casualty count\u00a0much higher<\/a>.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/center><\/p>\n

A clear majority of Iranians do not want the theocracy that came to power with the 1979 revolution. They want a secular democracy. But what does public opinion tell us about what that should entail and how this change should be achieved?<\/p>\n

Measuring public opinion in one of the world\u2019s most repressive countries is not an easy matter. Conventional surveys conducted through (landline) phones or by face-to-face interviews tend to reflect an implausibly homogeneous Islamic and pro-regime society. By contrast,\u00a0Gamaan\u00a0<\/a>\u2014 the Group for Analysing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran \u2014 conducts surveys anonymously through the internet.<\/p>\n

Our research is based on representative samples of anything from tens of thousands to over 100,000 respondents. In 2020 a Gamaan survey\u00a0revealed\u00a0a diverse, secularising and dissident society, in which around 70% rejected the compulsory hijab. These numbers materialised in the streets in 2022, during the\u00a0\u201cwoman life freedom\u201d <\/a> \u00a0protests (find out more about sample characteristics, weighting information, and external benchmark tests at\u00a0gamaan.org\u00a0and this\u00a0Wapor methodology webinar<\/a>).<\/p>\n

To improve randomisation, we collaborate with Psiphon VPN<\/a>, which is widely used<\/a> across Iran. By 2025, an estimated 90% of Iranian internet users relied on VPNs<\/a> to access blocked platforms, including basic messaging apps such as Whatsapp.<\/p>\n

This level of coverage enabled what we call VPN sampling, yielding large, socially diverse samples under conditions of safety and anonymity. Combined with scale, anonymity offers reliable insight into what Iranians really want. The latest survey on the\u00a012-day war with Israel<\/a>, taken in September 2025, secured more than 30,000 responses from inside the country.<\/p>\n

Why protests, again? What is different?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Our surveys consistently show that the majority shares a consensus on what it does not want. Across provinces, rural and urban areas, age groups and gender, roughly\u00a070\u201380% say\u00a0<\/a> they would not vote for the Islamic Republic.<\/p>\n

In all survey waves, support for regime change as a precondition for meaningful progress has been the most popular position. This support previously spiked during the \u201cwoman life freedom\u201d protests. We believe we are currently witnessing another spike, given the increase observed after the 12-day war.<\/p>\n

Continued in right column)<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Questions related to this article:<\/div>\n
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\nHow can we be sure to get news about peace demonstrations?<\/a><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

(Continued from left column)<\/p>\n

In contrast with the context of previous protests, the regime is militarily weakened from the 12-day war, during which many senior commanders were killed<\/a>. Iran is now culturally weakened, no longer able to enforce the compulsory hijab<\/a>. It is also economically weakened, with a plummeting currency<\/a>. <\/p>\n

Iranians believe that protests, foreign pressure and intervention are more likely to bring about political change than elections and reforms. They were thus emboldened when, for the first time, a US president\u00a0threatened intervention\u00a0<\/a> should protesters be killed. This came days after the abduction by the US military of the Venezuelan president, Nicol\u00e1s Maduro, a key ally of the Islamic Republic.<\/p>\n

What might lie ahead?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Protesters today separate the very idea of Iran from the Islamic Republic. They view the regime<\/a> as an alien element, an occupying force. This has long been expressed in slogans such as \u201cOur enemy is right here, they lie that it is America\u201d<\/a> and \u201cNot Gaza, not Lebanon, I only give my life for Iran\u201d<\/a> (supported respectively by 73%<\/a> and 64%<\/a> when we tested them in 2021). <\/p>\n

The popularity of\u00a0Reza Pahlavi<\/a>, the former crown prince in exile who represents inherited monarchical nationalism, can be understood in light of this Iran-first mentality. Pahlavi\u2019s social base remained stable in Gamaan\u2019s surveys between 2022 and 2025. Roughly one-third are strong supporters and another third strongly oppose him. The remaining segment somewhat agrees or disagrees, or expresses no opinion.<\/p>\n

The current surge in pro-Pahlavi slogans suggests that his popularity is attracting segments of the latter moderate or undecided population. But our surveys found that his popularity is unevenly distributed. It is lower in provinces with higher ethnic minority populations, such as the Kurds, Azeri Turks and Baluch.<\/p>\n

Although there is no consensus on the form or structure of an alternative political system, it is noteworthy that in 2025 there was, for the first time, a marked increase in support for monarchy. Given the significant size of those who do not voice a strong opinion on the alternative, any group that can successfully topple the Islamic Republic will have an advantage in convincing the majority to adopt its proposed model.<\/p>\n

Iranians overwhelmingly support a \u201cdemocratic political system\u201d \u2013 with 89%<\/a> in favour. Support for political liberalism, however, is weaker. In 2024, 43% agreed with having \u201ca strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections\u201d. This view is significantly higher among those without higher education<\/a> \u2013 among monarchists, it is 49%<\/a>.<\/p>\n

These facts should not be lamented or mocked but understood, if the threat of a lack of liberalism is to be mitigated. While nationalism may generate the force of a revolutionary storm capable of toppling the regime, long-term stability, after the fall of the Islamic Republic, will also require an acceptance of Iran\u2019s cultural and ideological diversity as permanent features of a truly free nation<\/p>\n

(Editor’s note: In suppressing the demonstrations, the Iranian government claimed <\/a> that it was manipulated by the United States and Israel, i.e. by agents of Mossad and the CIA. Reliable sources from Israel, such as the Jerusalem Post<\/a>, suggest that this probably has some truth.<\/p>\n

– – – – – –<\/p>\n

If you wish to make a comment on this article, you may write to coordinator@cpnn-world.org with the title “Comment on (name of article)” and we will put your comment on line. Because of the flood of spam, we have discontinued the direct application of comments.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION An article dated January 12 from The Conversation Iranians have shown a willingness to pay a devastating price for political change, as protest has consistently been met by the Islamic Republic with violence and mass killing. The death toll since Iranians took to the streets on December 28\u00a0has reportedly passed 500, … Continue reading Iran protests 2026: our surveys show Iranians agree more on regime change than what might come\u00a0next<\/span> →<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[15,74],"tags":[8],"class_list":["post-37672","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-information","category-mideast","tag-mideast"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/english.cpnn-world.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/37672","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/english.cpnn-world.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/english.cpnn-world.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/english.cpnn-world.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/english.cpnn-world.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=37672"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/english.cpnn-world.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/37672\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":37675,"href":"https:\/\/english.cpnn-world.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/37672\/revisions\/37675"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/english.cpnn-world.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=37672"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/english.cpnn-world.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=37672"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/english.cpnn-world.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=37672"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}